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M~uX%~-~, On the other hand, many now believe that even the use of a small, tactical nuclear device in most cases would inevitably lead to strategic nuclear war. 5
General Taylor believed that certain "new factors" required that we reassess our defense strategy. These were: (i) the missile gap loss of technological superiority over the Soviets; (2) our lack of a ballistic missile defense system; (3) our dwindling superiority in manned bombers; (4) the Soviets' drive to attain numerical superiority in intercontinental ballistic missile forces and to rely increasingly upon concealment, dispersio~and mobility; 6
(5) our civilian population becoming increasingly vulnerable to catastrophic loss because we lack an effective civil defense capability (still true today); (6) the increasing likelihood of general war by mistake or miscalculation; and (7) the growing inferiority of our conventional forces.
General Taylor offers four "quick fixes" to the above factors. He asserts that, if these fixes were to be made in conjunction with a recasting of our long term actions, we could develop a "National
Military Program of Flexible Response:" 7 "1. Improved planning and training for limited war.
Exploitation of the mobile Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. 8
3. Better protection for the Strategic Air Command.
A limited fall-out shelter program. "9
For the most part, General Taylor was right in his statement of "A "In such a situation of nuclear parity, where both sides had the capability of destroying one another, there was no place for a policy of massive nuclear retaliation except as a d~errent to total nuclear war or as a reprisal if one began. This fact had become so apparent that it was doubtful whether either the Soviets or our allies believed that we would use l~ur retaliato~ power for an~hing other than to prese~e our own existence. ~
A PRESCRIPTION FOR THE ARMY
General Taylor saw a need for both a nuclear and conventional capability for the Army. His approach covered four major Army programs that needed attention, as outlined in ~We must provide for a ~riking force which is clearly capable of su~iving a surprise a~ack and of inflicting unacceptable losses on the USSR...targets amount only to a few score, at the most to a few hundred. Even after adding a heaw factor of safe~ to cover imponderables, the size of the required atomic retaliato~ force ~1 be found to be much smaller than the bombers and missiles of our present force." General Taylor's prescription for how the budget should be built based on comparative force structures and costs is a good one. It would give the Secretary of Defense a way of understanding means and ends and arriving at a logical defense budget.
CONCLUSION
"The Uncertain Trumpet" is a remarkably clear military strategy.
In retrospect, its vision was almost 20-20. But it was flawed in several respects. It assumed the need for a standing Army in ~peacetime that we simply could not afford. It over-emphasized the need for a defensive missile system; as we have seen, the absence of such a system has not caused deterrence to fail. And, because it fought the inevitability of Army force reductions, it missed an opportunity to make an indelible statement about the need for a continuously modernized conventional force --a statement that might have helped even in today's policy debates over the so-called peace dividend.
